Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Adriana Cornelia Pearson v. Kimber Lee Pearson :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Randy S. Ludlow; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Neils E. Mortenson; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pearson v. Pearson, No. 17094 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2376

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

) c-)iu.

-vsKIMBER LEE PEARSON,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Salt Lake Cou~ty, State of Utah
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge
Randy S. Ludlow
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plain~iff-A9pella~t
Neils E. Mortenson
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Defend~nt-Respondent.

F

r.

.· - -o
.

l

·,1

'

.....,,.1

________
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum andliiii'
Library
Services
. .·----- Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C1n7\: :':'.!.:;-er:::: C·:: ·_:~·-~, C:·~!1

..,.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON,

)

Plaintiff-Appella~t,

)

-vs-

)

KIMBER LEE PEARSON,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge
Randy S. Ludlow
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plaintif f-Appella~t
Neils E. Mortenson
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATURE OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

CONCLUSION

9

CASES CITED
,..

Kessirnakis v. Kessirnakis, 545 P2d 888 (1976)

0

Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (1980)

8

McGavin v. McGavin,

5

27 U2d 200, 494 P2d 283 (1972)

AUTHORITIES CITED

3, 5, 6, 8, 9

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)

(1) & (3)

6

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)

(7)

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ADRIANA CORNELIA PEARSON,

)

Plaintiff-A~pellant,

)

-vs-

CASE NO. 17094

)

KIMBER LEE PEARSON,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an

ac~ion

by a divorced husband, respondent,

to set aside or vacate the Decree of Divorce previously entered
by the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup set aside the Decree of
Divorce entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the order of Judge Rigtrup
reversed and the original Judgment and Decree of Divorce reinstated.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
An Amended Verified Complaint was filed on March 7, 1979,
by the appellant (R-15-19).

The respondent thereafter came to the

off ices of the attorney for the appellant where he was presented
with a copy of the Amended Verified Complaint, which Complaint was
explained to

the respondent.

The respondent thereupon agreed to

the terms of the Amended Verified Complaint (Deposition of Diana
Tulpinski p. 3-7).

Respondent was presented with the Acknowledg-

ment of Service of the Amended Varif ied Complaint, Waiver and
Consen~

to Default which he willingly signed (R-20, 47-54; D-4 the

Deposition of Diana Tulpinski p. 3-7).

The appellant obtained a

divorce on May l, 1979, with the Decree of Divorce being signed by
Judge James S. Sawaya on May 11, 1979 (R-20-30).
The respondent obtained a copy of the Findings

o=·Fac~

and

Decree of Divorce on July 26, 1979 (R-36).
The appellant got an Order to Show Cause against the
respondent to have the respondent comply with the terms of the
Decree of Divorce (R-32, 37-38), which

Orde~

to Show Cause was pre-

sented to the Court on October 30, 1979, and served uoon the resoon~

dent on November 8, 1979.

At the hearing in front of the Honorable

Christine Durham on November 29, 1979, respondent, through his
ney, presented the appellant with his Motion to Set Aside the
rnent, along with the accompanying Affidavit (R-34-36, 39-42).

-
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Respondent was seeking to have the Decree of Divorce set aside
under Rule 60(b) and in particular Rule 60(b) (3), based upon
alleged fraud and

~isrepresentation

a~

(R-35-36 and 39).

Respondent's Motion was heard on April 4,

1980 by Judge

Rigtrup who set aside the Decree of Divorce (R-46, 54-57).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SETTING ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms a.s are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons
(1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4)
when, for any cause, the .summons in a~
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defenda~t
has failed to appear in said action; (5)
the judgment is
void; (6)
the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upo~
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons ( 1) , ( 2) , ( 3) , or ( 4)
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A Motion under this

-
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subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit
the oower of a court to entertain an independent
action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action."
~

The Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce in the above
entitled action had been brought under Rule 60(b) (1)

a~d

the respondent represented there had neen a mistake,

inadvertence,

su~prise

(3) where

or excusable neglect and/or fraud or misrepresentation in

this action (R-35).

The argument as to the fraud charge was reputed

by the Affidavit of the appellant (R-50), her attorney (R-47), the
Affidavit of Susan McCarthy (R-52), and the deposition of Diana
Tulpinski~

~11

of whom specifically stated that the respondent had

come to the offices of the appellant's attorney, he was ?resented
with the copy of the Amended Verified Complaint, and he had willingly,
freely and voluntarily signed the Waiver and Acknowledgment of
Service and Consent to Default (R-20) .

The respondent states in

his Affidavit that he had obtained a copy of the Decree of Divorce
on approximately July 26, 1979, which was one and on-half months
after the Decree of Divorce had been entered (R-36,

28).

(It should

be noted that the attorney for the appellant represented to the
Court that the respondent had set approximately three appointments
with said attorney to pick up copies of the Decree of Divorce, but
that he had failed to keep said appointments, and further had refused
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to

give the attorney for the appellant an address where copies

could be sent to said respondent.)

Even though a copy had

been obtained by the respondent on J~ly 25,

1979, the respon-

dent failed to act or take any action until November 20,

1979,

a period of almost four full months after the date that the
respondent had obtained a copy of the Decree of Divorce.
This was clearly beyond the time period allowed under Rule
60(b) which requires that a party seek its relief within
three (3) months after the Judgment or Order has been entered.
In McGavin ·v. McGavin,

27 U2d 200, 494 P2d 233 (1972),

an

action involving a claim by a former husband that his former
wife had perpetrated a fraud on the divorce court claiming
that the former husband was the father of a child that was unborn at the time of the divorce, this court held that after
the period of time of 14~ months had elapsed since the Decree
of Divorce had been entered that the former husband had to
pursue his oossible remedies in a separate action and could
not attempt to set aside the Decree of Divorce in that action.
This court required that there must be compliance with the
3-rnonth procedure set forth in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

.

Since there was no compliance with this

rule, this court rejected the claim of the former husband.
In the case before this court, the respondent had failed to

- 5 -
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'

act within the prescribed time period,

and if he is to attack the

Decree, he must do so in a separate action and not in this particular case.
The respondent attempted to have the

J~dgment

set aside

under Rule 60(b) and in particular Rule 60(b) (1) and (3).

The

court denied allowing the judgment to be set aside under either of
those two rules.

The court thereafter, however,

set the Judgment

aside under Rule 60(b) (7) on its own motion and without ever having
been requested ny respondent or his counsel.

Such a setting aside

was totally an abuse of discretion by the court and without merit.
In Kessirnakis v. Kessimakis,

546 P2d 888 (1976), this

court held in a case where the defendant had made a Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment in a divorce action 5-2/3's
J~dgment

mo~tha

after the

had been entered, that the trial court had no jurisdiction

to set aside the Judgment.

In Kessirnakis,

the

defenda~t

attempted

to have the court relieve him of a financial burden which had been
placed upon him as being an inequity against him.

This court held

that that was not a reason for setting aside the Judgment.
trial court in this matter was without

jurisdictio~

the property agreement; six months had elapsed,
court without jurisdiction.

The

to set aside

leaving the trial

In setting aside the JJdgment, the

trial court in the instant case has abused its discretion and said
Judgment should be re-instated and affirmed by this court.

POINT II
THE CONTRACTING WAIVER OF RIGHTS SHOULD BE
GIVEN SANCTION BY THE COURT
It is clearly established by the Affidavit of the
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appella~t

(R-50), the Affidavit of the attorney for the appella~t
(R-47), the deposition o~ Diana Tulpinski, and the Affidavit
~

of Susan McCarthy (R-52), that the respondent had voluntarily
and freely,

of his own will and volition, agreed to the terms

that were set forth in the Amended Verified Complaint, and
that such Amended V2rif ied Complaint was the only Amended
Complaint which was prepared in this matter, the only one
presented to the respondent, the only one filed with the
Clerk of the Court, and the only one upon which the respondent made his agreement, and further,

the one upon which the

respondent thereafter signed the Waiver of Service, Acknowledgment and Consent to Default (R-20) .

The respondent took

no action of any type contesting the Amended V2rif ied

Complain~

or the Decree of Divorce until the date upon which the Order
to Show Cause hearing filed by the appellant was held to
require

~he

respondent to comply with the terms and conditions

of the Decree of Divorce.

It is reasonable to believe that

no action would ever have been taken by the respondent had
not the appellant taken action to have the Decree of Divorce
complied with by the respondent.
The Amended Verified Complaint contains the exact provisions as the Decree of Divorce, with the exception of a
minor modification as to specifically naming utility bills.
The respondent had in this matter contracted away his rights
and privileges, and as such he should not be given the oppor-

7 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tunity to have the property settlement that had been agreed to by
him set aside.
held,

In Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (1980), this court

in an attem?t by the husband to

~ave

the Decree of Divorce

modified, which modification was denied,

when a Decree is based on a ?roperty settlement
agreement, forged by the parties and 3anctioned by the
court, equity must take such agreement into consideration.
Equity is not available to ~e-instate the rights a~d
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because
one has come to regret the bargain it made. Accordingly,
the law limits the contin~ing jurisdiction of the court
where a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the Decree . . . 11 p.1250
11

••

In this particular case there was no com?elling reason for the
setting aside of the Decree of Divorce.

The respondent had appa-

rently come to regret his decision, and was attem?ting through
means,

11

whether by hook or by crook", to have the Decree set

aside, which the trial court allowed.
or proven by the

respo~dent,

There was no inequity shown

or as previously stated, any compel-

ling reason why the Decree of Divorce should be set aside.
fo~

60(b) limits the bringing of actions to three months
aside of Judgments and Decrees.

Rule

setting

The reason for such rule is that

there must be some period of time upon which Judgments and Decrees
can no longer by challenged so as to give vested property rights
in individuals.

To allow such agreements as have been made in this

particular case to be set aside upon any whim would

~ean

that at

no time would any party be secure in the rights and privileges

-
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which they have been awarded by a Decree.

It could very easily

be seen as preventing the transferring of any real or personal
property rights at any time.

Courts need to give sanctity to a

Decree in order to give credence and credibility to the rulings
and decisions by the court for the protection of the society and
the contracting of rights by individual parties.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was without jurisdiction to set aside
the Decree of Divorce in this action.

The respondent had failed

to meet any of the requirements or provisions of Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This action should be re-

manded to the trial court with directions that the original Decree
of Divorce be re-instated for failure to comply with Rule 60 (b)
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